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Introduction
Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1980), based on his lectures at Princeton 
University in 1970, challenges the Kant’s doctrine of a priori, a posteriori, necessity, 
and contingency. Its theses problematize the Kantian point of view and reintroduce 
the possibility of metaphysics inquiries in the philosophical field.
This article tries to show that the distinction between metaphysics and 
epistemology is Kripke’s main strategy for sustaining the existence of necessary a 
posteriori judgments and contingent a priori judgments. However, this distinction is 
based on a misunderstanding of Kant’s objective epistemology and overlooks Kant’s 
criticisms of the metaphysics’ claim to know the world itself. 
Besides, this text defends that the distinction between metaphysics and 
epistemology has serious consequences that can restrict or even deny some 
epistemological or metaphysical claims. If a priori judgments are not automatically 
necessary, what is the basis of mathematics? How can the concept of epistemology 
assumed by Kripke deal with the problem of justification? On the other hand, how can 
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Kripke defend the necessity of certain judgment? His theory of naming can provide a 
sufficient basis for this?
The debate about necessity and apriority
In Necessity and apriority, Barnes (2007) uses the term “classic” to denominate 
the view of Leibniz, Kant, and Whewell about the relationship between necessity 
and apriority. According to this view, “knowledge of necessity must be a priori since 
the senses alone are inadequate to justify a claim of necessity. The senses tell us 
what the case is, but not that it must be the case” (2007, p. 496). However, Barnes 
states that “the classical view is now widely rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam discovered that there are propositions that are both necessary and a 
posteriori” (idem, ibidem). 
According to him, the debate concerning the epistemology of necessary a 
posteriori truths has recently generated two views: the neoclassical and the neo-
empiricist. The first one, represented by Sidelle (1986), Bealer (1987), Chalmers 
(1996), and Jackson (1998), holds that “our knowledge of every necessary truth 
depends on at least one item of a priori knowledge” (Barnes, 2007, p. 496). The 
second one, represented by Block and Stalnaker (1999), holds that “knowledge of 
necessity is possible without a priori knowledge” (Barnes, 2007, p. 496). 
Barnes’ article can be included in the neoclassical view. He tries to prove “that 
knowledge of necessity requires that we have some a priori knowledge” (Barnes, 
2007, p. 496). His argument is basically this: 
a) Premise 1: “if there is no good empirical explanation of our knowledge of 
necessity, then it would seem that our knowledge of necessity requires that we have 
some a priori knowledge” (2007, p. 499); 
b) Premise 2: “necessity is simply not among the contents of our sense 
experiences, even on the most liberal interpretation of those contents. Therefore, 
if we consider only the contents of our sense experiences, without any further 
cognitive processing, then the truth of a belief in necessity would have to be deemed 
accidental” (2007, p. 500); 
c) Conclusion: “So if we do have knowledge of necessity, then this gives us 
strong reason to believe that we have some a priori knowledge” (2007, p. 521). 
This argumentation can be persuasive, but it cannot offer an appropriate 
response to the Kripke’s thesis. The reason is that it does not face the main strategy of 
Kripke’s approach to the relationship between a priori and necessity: the distinction 
between epistemology and metaphysics. Therefore, it is useless to demonstrate, as 
Barnes does, that we cannot know the necessity on the basis of sense experiences. 
Kripke could just repeat what he wrote in Naming and Necessity: “I am concerned 
Kripke’s metaphysical necessity: a Kantian perspective
 Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã | jan.-jun. 2021 35
with here is a notion [of necessity] which is not a notion of epistemology but of 
metaphysics” (1980, p. 35). In the metaphysical context, to be necessary has nothing 
to do with being known a priori, just because the question about knowledge cannot 
even be formulated here. In the metaphysical domain, 
we ask whether something might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if 
something is false, it’s obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might it have been 
otherwise? Is it possible that, in this respect, the world should have been different 
from the way it is? If the answer is “no”, then this fact about the world is a necessary 
one. If the answer is “yes”, then this fact about the world is a contingent one (1980, 
pp. 35-6).
For Kripke, necessary is any fact that happens in all possible worlds, no matter 
if there is someone to know it. That is, necessity is the modality related to the 
existence of the things, not the knowledge about them. As Kripke insists, “this in and 
of itself has nothing to do with anyone’s knowledge of anything” (1980, p. 36). For 
example, if the speed of light in the vacuum is necessarily (in a metaphysical sense) 
equal to c (approximately 300,000 Km/s), then in all possible worlds this will be the 
speed of light in the vacuum, even if there is no one to measure it.
Kripke offers the following example:
Consider, say, Fermat’s last theorem — or the Goldbach conjecture. The Goldbach 
conjecture says that an even number greater than 2 must be the sum of two prime 
numbers. If this is true, it is presumably necessary, and, if it is false, presumably 
necessarily false (1980, p. 36).
The Goldbach conjecture cannot be contingently true or false. Either each 
number greater than 2 is equal to the sum of two prime numbers, or not. In this 
view, the Goldbach conjecture concerns a mathematical fact. If the conjecture is 
true, the fact necessarily occurs, that is, it is the case in all possible worlds. The 
Goldbach conjecture, if true, expresses a necessary relationship among numbers, 
not a necessary relationship between human beings and the mathematical world, in 
the sense that all individuals know it.
In fact, we do not know that. Even today we do not know if the Goldbach 
conjecture is true or false. For Kripke, this means that we do not have any a priori 
knowledge about it. But the mathematical fact, whatever it is, “exist” and it is 
necessary in the “mathematical world”. Perhaps in the future we will find out what 
the case is, and then our knowledge of it will be a posteriori, although the fact is 
necessary. According to Kripke’s approach, this shows that the metaphysical necessity 
must be distinguished from epistemological apriority.
Kripke states not only the existence of necessary a posteriori truths but also 
of contingent a priori truths. Kripke cites the examples introduced by Kant, “gold 
is a yellow metal” (Kripke, 1980, p. 39), and by Wittgenstein, “one meter is to be 
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the length of S where S is a certain stick or bar in Paris” (Kripke, 1980, p. 54). For 
Kripke, both are a priori but contingents. It is possible to postulate a world where 
the gold is not a yellow metal, and the bar of Paris is not one meter long. In the 
case of the standard meter in Paris, we know, for example, that a bar, in different 
temperatures, will be longer or shorter. Moreover, even if we do not know this fact, 
we could imagine a world where something like this happens.
The difference between metaphysical and epistemological approaches allows 
Kripke to talk about the world beyond what we know, and to compare it with what 
we currently know. Using this resource, Kripke can show a priori truths that are not 
metaphysically necessary and a posteriori truths that are metaphysically necessary.
Accepting the difference between metaphysical necessity and epistemological 
apriority, the argument of the neoclassical view becomes obsolete. Even if the 
sensory experience cannot provide knowledge of necessary truths, it does not imply 
that the metaphysical necessity does not exist in reality, although it is not known. 
Apriority and necessity, in Kripke’s approach, become concepts totally not related to 
each other’s. The modality (necessity or contingency) of a fact has nothing to do with 
how (a priori or a posteriori) we know it. It is possible to be born knowing (apriority) 
some contingent fact or never to discover a necessary fact. 
Therefore, the dispute between neoclassical and neo-empiricist views about 
necessity is pointless, because they are epistemological positions, but the Kripkean 
necessity refers just to the metaphysical realm, and, as Kripke overstresses, they 
are “two different domains, two different areas, the epistemological and the 
metaphysical” (1980, p. 36). For that reason, we need to reflect on the novelty 
introduced by Kripke: the metaphysical necessity.
Naming produces the metaphysical necessity
Kripke refers to the metaphysical dimension through the notion of possible 
worlds. As Kripke emphasizes, “a possible world is given by the descriptive conditions 
we associate with it. [...] ‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by 
powerful telescopes” (Kripke, 1980, p. 44). In other words, we do not know all the 
possible worlds. Yet, we can stipulate how they should be. To achieve this, we use 
the descriptive conditions entailed by our current knowledge. When we are talking 
about the epistemological dimension, we are investigating how we can discover what 
the world is. However, in the metaphysical dimension, we are thinking about the 
implication of the descriptive conditions implicit in our language for all possible 
worlds.
In Naming and Necessity, the names play a fundamental role to access the 
metaphysical domain. They set up the descriptive conditions that allow talking 
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about others possible worlds. They can do that because “names are always rigid 
designators” (1980, p. 58), and something is “a rigid designator if in every possible 
world it designates the same object” (1980, p. 48). A name refers determinate thing 
that is the same in all possible worlds where it exists. Therefore, the names fix the 
transworld identities that we can use to access all possible worlds where they occur. 
“Meter”, for example, “designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds, which 
in the actual world happens to be the length of the stick S at t0” (1980, p. 55).
For Kripke, names are rigid designators because the descriptions that we 
associate with them are not their meaning: “we merely use the description to fix 
the referent” (1980, p. 57). A referent is a determinate person, object, fact, etc., 
that we can access with the names of our language, but it can also exist in other 
possible worlds. This process allows associating other descriptions with those names. 
For example, “Meter” is a certain length, always the same in all possible worlds. 
However, it is easy to think about worlds where the length of that stick S is not equal 
to one meter. 
Through this method, we can stipulate other possible worlds by accessing the 
metaphysical dimension of which Kripke is speaking. The possible worlds are all the 
descriptions we can associate with the referents of the names of our language. To 
investigate the metaphysical necessity means to ask ourselves which descriptions 
are necessarily associated with them. That is the core of Kripke’s thesis: naming 
produces metaphysical necessity.
The necessary descriptions of a name are the essential properties of its 
referent. For example, Aristotle might not have taught Alexander, and Nixon might 
not have been President of USA. However, according to Kripke’s conclusions, is 
metaphysically necessary “that light is a stream of photons, that water is H2O, that 
lightning is an electrical discharge, that gold is the element with the atomic number 
79” (1980, p. 116). 
Concerning this last fact, according to Kripke, scientists have discovered the 
essential properties of gold. Therefore, in any possible world where gold exists, the 
gold will be the element with atomic number 79, since this property forms “the basis 
of what the substance is” or “it is part of the nature of gold” (1980, p. 125). If this 
property is not present, there is no gold. 
Kripke is not talking about definitional equivalences. That is why the names can 
be changed. Nixon might not have been called “Nixon”, but the essential properties 
of this man must be the same in all possible worlds. The naming is an “initial baptism” 
that happens in this way:
The object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by 
a description. When the name is “passed from link to link”, the receiver of the name 
must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man 
from whom he heard it (1980, p. 96).
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The name provides access to the referent using ostension or description. 
However, when we get the referent, we can leave the ostension, the description, 
and even the name. We can create a new name, for example. And, when we think 
about the referent, we can stipulate the properties that it must have in all possible 
worlds. That is the metaphysical realm.
But what Kripke thinks about epistemology?
The subjective epistemology and its consequences
As shown above, Kripke introduces the notion of epistemology when he talks 
about a priori. For him, “the notion of a prioricity is a concept of epistemology. I 
guess the traditional characterization from Kant goes something like: a priori truths 
are those which can be known independently of any experience” (1980, p. 34). But 
this possibility can only be investigated if we specify the knower: “And possible for 
whom? For God? For the Martians? Or just for people with minds like ours?” (1980, 
p. 34). That is, he relates the a priori to a particular cognitive act, performed by an 
individual psychological subject. Thus, a truth is a priori if an individual acquires it 
independently of any experience. In this case, the role of epistemology is precisely 
to analyze if the knowledge of a particular individual has been acquired through 
experience (a posteriori) or without appeal to it (a priori). 
From this point of view, Kripke criticizes the traditional interpretation of the 
a priori knowledge. For him, “some philosophers somehow change the modality in 
this characterization from can to must. They think that if something belongs to the 
realm of a priori knowledge, it couldn’t possibly be known empirically” (1980, p. 
35). In other words, he thinks that what can be known without experience, can also 
be known empirically. Kant would have argued we can know certain things a priori, 
but not that we must know these things a priori, and there is no reason to change 
the modality from “can” to “must”. Some people will know them a priori, while 
others will know them on the basis of experience. That means, in Kripke’s approach, 
a priori and a posteriori have nothing to do with the nature of a specific piece of 
knowledge, but only with how a particular individual acquires it.
This point of view is especially interesting when he talks about mathematics. 
Normally we consider mathematics an a priori knowledge. For Kripke, this is not 
necessary. For example, someone can make the calculations to know if a number is 
prime, but another person can use a calculator. “So ‘can be known a priori’ doesn’t 
mean ‘must be known a priori’” (1980, p. 35).
This argument suggests that a mathematical truth can be a priori or a posteriori 
depending on how the individual apprehended it. For someone it will be a priori, for 
others, it will be a posteriori. In fact, for the same person, it may be a priori or a 
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posteriori in different times and cognitive acts. For example, we can learn that 235 
multiplied by 45 equals 10575 of a calculator. After, we can do the calculations and 
find out for ourselves. In the first case, it will be a posteriori, while in the second 
case it will be a priori.
However, if the a priori and a posteriori are just two different ways how 
we can learn something, they cannot be used to determine its necessity, that is, if 
something is necessarily true or not. For our philosophical tradition, mathematical 
propositions are necessary because they are a priori, either in a synthetic (Kant) or 
in an analytical sense (Russell and the other logicists). When Kripke separates the a 
priori and the necessity in two different domains, he attacks the very foundations 
of mathematics. From a metaphysical point of view, it will be still possible to say 
that there are necessary mathematical truths. However, we no longer will be able 
to determine whether this or that particular mathematical proposition is necessarily 
true or false. That is because the a priori, in Kripke’s approach, is just a psychological 
phenomenon: an individual discovers something without appealing to the experience.
Someone may argue that Kripke does not want to deny the mathematical 
truths or the possibility to know them a priori. He only would intend to show that 
the necessary truths can also be known a posteriori. However, when Kripke does 
this, he reduces epistemology to a psychological inquiry concerning the acquisition 
of knowledge. Epistemology can no longer study the nature of the mathematical 
propositions to determine whether they are necessarily true or false. In other 
words, epistemology can no longer deal with the question of the justification of 
mathematical knowledge. Even if we know something a priori, we cannot claim we 
have a necessary truth, because, according to Kripke’s thesis, apriority and necessity 
concern different questions or domains.
Kant’s objective epistemology
The preoccupation with the epistemic justification is one of the most 
important motivations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Hume (1997) produced 
skeptical results by demonstrating that our knowledge of the world originates from 
empirical experience. Kant accepts Hume’s criticism of metaphysics. However, he 
tries to avoid this general skeptical consequence through the distinction between 
to commence with the experience (mit der Erfahrung anheben) and to arise from 
experience (aus der Erfahrung anheben): “But although all our cognition commences 
with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience” (1998, p. 
136, B1). According to Kant, there are a priori elements (space, time, and categories) 
that do not arise from experience and are capable of giving our knowledge universality 
and necessity.
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Is Kant describing how each particular individual knows something in all 
possible circumstances? Of course not. This issue becomes clear when we read the 
following passage from Kant’s Lectures on Logic:
One can distinguish cognitions, then,
1. according to their objective origin, i.e., according to the sources 
from which alone a cognition is possible. In this respect all cognitions 
are either rational or empirical;
2. according to their subjective origin, i.e., according to the way in 
which a cognition can be acquired by men. Considered from this latter 
viewpoint, cognitions are either rational or historical, however they 
may have arisen in themselves. Hence something that is subjectively 
only historical can be objectively a cognition of reason. (1992, pp. 
535-536, A22).
As we can see, Kant introduces two ways of classifying cognitions (Erkenntnisse): 
according to their objective origin (objectiven Ursprunge) or according to their 
subjective origin (subjectiven Usprunge). The latter corresponds to the concept 
of epistemology as Kripke understands it. The main question here is whether an 
individual has learned something by himself or through another source. For Kant, 
in the first case his knowledge will be rational; in the second will be historical. In 
Kripke’s epistemology, this corresponds to a priori and a posteriori respectively.
Therefore, we can say that Kant has taken into account the fact that Kripke 
is considering: the possibility of learning something like mathematics through 
experience (through the testimony of someone, through a calculator, etc.). As Kant 
states, 
Cognitions of reason are opposed to historical cognitions. The former are cognitions 
from principles (ex principiis), the latter cognitions from data (ex datis). — A cognition 
can have arisen from reason and in spite of that be historical, however, as when a 
mere literator learns the products of someone else’s reason his cognition of these 
products of reason is then merely historical, for example (1992, p. 535, A22).
We can learn that 7 plus 5 equals 12 from our teacher, but this does not change 
the epistemological status of mathematics, which is for Kant a rational knowledge 
based on principles. We are just talking about how real people acquire knowledge, 
not about some inner feature of that knowledge. The cognition will be subjectively 
historical, but objectively rational.
A subjectivist epistemology can investigate if a particular individual has 
acquired knowledge from his reason or data. However, this is not the task of the 
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Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant introduces the concept of a priori (and a 
posteriori). The Critique investigates the objective origin of cognition. In his words, 
“we have explained cognitions of reason as cognitions from principles, and from this 
it follows that they must be a priori” (1992, p. 536, A23). 
Against Kripke’s interpretation, mentioned above, it is clear the modality of 
Kant’s statement. He uses “must” (müssen), not “can” (können). The reason is that 
Kant accepts Hume’s criticism of the classical metaphysics. He knows that it is not 
possible to construct universal and necessary judgments on the basis of experience. 
Their objective foundations can only be the inner principle of reason. Thus, universal 
and necessary judgments can only be a priori, that is, originating from the principles 
of reason.
According to Haddock, the Kripkean thesis about a posteriori mathematical 
statements “is based on a confusion […] between ‘being grounded on experience’ 
and ‘having its origin in experience’” (2012, p. 293). Following the Kantian tradition, 
for him “a statement is a posteriori if its truth (or falsity) is not merely known by 
us empirically, but moreover, if our knowledge of its truth (or falsity) is essentially 
dependent on experience – in the sense that it could not have been obtained by 
other means” (idem, p. 294). In other words, we cannot justify any answer to any 
mathematical question on the basis of experience. The Kantian epistemology deals 
just with the question about the justification of knowledge, that is, the objective 
origin of a cognition. And it is just in the realm of objective epistemology where Kant 
introduces the concept of a priori (and a posteriori). 
In turn, Kripke uses the concepts of a priori and a posteriori in a very different 
sense, as Haddock points out (2012, p. 294). From a Kantian point of view, Kripke is 
saying that cognitions can be rational (a priori) or historical (a posteriori). However, 
both cases refer to their subjective origins, and that is not the place to talk about 
necessity or contingency. 
The Kantian denial of the metaphysical pretension of formal logic
Kant not only argues that some kinds of knowledge, such as mathematics, 
has an objective basis, but he also intends to establish, following Hume, the limits 
of our a priori knowledge. That can be understood especially in his classification of 
logic. According to Kant (1998, p. 194, B76), it can be divided into general logic and 
particular logic. The former, also called elementary logic, concerns the necessary rules 
of thinking, regardless of any subjects. The latter, also called organon, investigates 
the rules we use when we think of certain types of objects.
The general logic has just one principle: the non-contradiction. It is elementary 
because it is the basis of any other use of the understanding. Particular logic, in 
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turn, investigates the formal rules of a given field of knowledge (e.g., physics). 
It is also formal, but it addresses the judgments of a particular area of study. It is 
an organon, that is, an instrument that helps a given scientific discipline to form 
itself, formalizing or even axiomatizing its essential foundations or presuppositions. 
However, it is important to realize that, although it focuses on the foundations of 
a science, it must emerge at last. It only formalizes, clarifies and gives rigor to a 
knowledge that has already been acquired from another source. In other words, no 
knowledge can be drawn from logic, even a particular one. It can give form (logic) to 
knowledge already possessed, but it cannot tell how the world is or could be.
Continuing his classification, Kant states (1998, pp. 194-5, B77) that the 
general logic can be pure or applied. In the first case, the general logic is a canon, 
that is, a set of formal rules that arise from the principle of contradiction, which 
govern the working of pure understanding. In the second case, the general logic 
is a cathartic of the common understanding, that is, an application of the general 
rules on the understanding of an empirical subject, which can be influenced by 
prejudices, inclinations, and so on. The precise purpose of the latter is the catharsis, 
the “purification” of the empirical subject. In this way, he can avoid fallacies and 
judge based exclusively on the pure general rules of understanding.
By these assumptions, Kant indicates (1998, pp. 198, B84-5) two possible uses 
of general logic: the analytics and the dialectics. Analytics is the correct use of 
general logic. Why is it correct? Because it is limited to the form of judgments, without 
intending to determine something about its content. It is a negative touchstone 
(Probierstein) of the truth of judgments. That is, by analyzing a judgment, one can 
verify whether it is contradictory or not. If it is, it cannot be true. If it is not, it can 
be true or false. However, the general logic cannot either produce judgments or 
provide positive criteria for deciding which judgment is true. To produce judgments 
about objects, as Kant says, one has to get out of logic to obtain information. Only 
then it will be possible to connect different pieces of information and see if the 
resultant judgments are contradictory or not.
On the other hand, dialectics is precisely this pretension to learn something 
about the actual world from the general logic. In this case, the general logic 
becomes an organon, that is, a tool to know something. However, as Kant advises, 
“the dialectics is the logic of illusion – a sophistical art for giving to its ignorance [..] 
the air of truth” (1998, pp. 198, B86). The dialectics produces the illusion that it is 
possible to say something about the world on the basis of the laws of logic.
This point is important for two reasons: first, it shows that Kripke’s interpretation 
about the Kantian example, “Gold is a yellow metal” as an a priori but contingent 
truth, is unfair; secondly, it shows the dangers of trying to say something about the 
world on the basis of logic.
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On the first point, Kant indeed suggests that “Gold is a yellow metal” is an a 
priori judgment. Moreover, we also need to agree with Kripke when he shows that the 
gold is not necessarily a yellow metal. However, we must understand the context of 
Kant’s statement. When Kant uses this example, in Prolegomena, he is addressing the 
difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. He shows that “the predicate 
of an affirmative analytic judgment is already thought beforehand in the concept 
of the subject, it cannot be denied of that subject without contradiction” (2004, p. 
17, A25-26). In other words, when we assign a predicate to a concept that implicitly 
already contains it, we are producing an analytic judgment, and this judgment is a 
priori.
However, this does not imply that we know the meaning of all the words of 
this judgment without any experience. For Kant, this is impossible. We need the 
experience to know what gold, metal, and yellow are. A priori is just the connection 
between gold and yellow metal. However, this connection is only possible once we 
know the meaning of these concepts. In this case, when we say, “Gold is a yellow 
metal”, we are only explaining the meaning of gold we learn from experience. As 
Kant states,
For that reason all analytic propositions are still a priori judgments even if their 
concepts are empirical, as in: Gold is a yellow metal; for in order to know this, I need 
no further experience outside my concept of gold, which includes that this body is 
yellow and a metal; for this constitutes my very concept, and I did not have to do 
anything except analyze it, without looking beyond it to something else (2004, p. 17, 
A26). 
As we can see, in this example Kant assumes that Gold is a yellow metal. 
This information comes from experience, that is, Gold is an empirical (a posteriori) 
concept. If we already know what Gold is, the judgment, “Gold is a yellow metal”, 
does not add any information. Therefore it is analytic, not synthetic, and, for the 
same reason, it is a priori.
Making it clear, Kant is not saying that the empirical concept of Gold is a 
priori and necessary. We need to learn what Gold is from experience, not from pure 
reason. The logic only shows the relationship between the concepts we already have. 
It cannot produce these concepts.
On the second point, we must remember the Kripke’s thesis presented above: 
“Gold is an element with atomic number 79” is a metaphysically (not scientifically) 
necessary truth. In all possible worlds where gold exists, that is its nature. However, 
how can Kripke justify this statement?
The answer should be the Kripkean theory of naming. The naming produces 
necessity. However, how can a theory about the language determine whether a 
proposition is true or false? Apparently, Kripke’s theory of language has become a 
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tool (organon) to know something about the world. That means Kripke fell into the 
trap of dialectics, as Kant warned. He wants to say something about the actual world 
beyond all possible experience. 
According to Kant’s Critique, that is impossible, as we have seen above. But 
there is another argument against this claim of the Kripkean theory of naming. We 
must remember that Kripke, at least in Naming and Necessity, reduces epistemology 
to a psychological approach, denying its capacity to offer any approach to justification. 
So, it is impossible for him to say that a specific object, like “an element with atomic 
number 79”, is the adequate referent to the name “gold”. Because to say that is 
the same as saying that the proposition “Gold is an element with atomic number 
79” is true. But, if epistemology is just a psychological investigation about how we 
learn, it cannot offer sufficient justification for any proposition. Without fulfilling 
this epistemological task, any naming will be arbitrary, in the sense that we will not 
know what the referent of the name is.
Metaphysical versus epistemological necessity
As we can see, the basis of Kripke’s theses in Naming and Necessity is the 
distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemological apriority. This 
distinction gives him the chance to propose the existence of a posteriori necessary 
and a priori contingent truths.
But let’s think again about a passage partially quoted above, where Kripke 
introduces the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology:
The second concept which is in question is that of necessity. Sometimes this is 
used in an epistemological way and might then just mean a priori. And of course, 
sometimes it is used in a physical way when people distinguish between physical 
and logical necessity. But what I am concerned with here is a notion which is not a 
notion of epistemology but of metaphysics, in some (I hope) nonpejorative sense. 
We ask whether something might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if 
something is false, it’s obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might it have been 
otherwise? Is it possible that, in this respect, the world should have been different 
from the way it is? If the answer is “no”, then this fact about the world is a necessary 
one. If the answer is “yes”, then this fact about the world is a contingent one. This in 
and of itself has nothing to do with anyone’s knowledge of anything. It’s certainly a 
philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious definitional equivalence, either that 
everything a priori is necessary or that everything necessary is a priori. Both concepts 
may be vague. That may be another problem. But at any rate they are dealing with 
two different domains, two different areas, the epistemological and the metaphysical 
(1980, pp. 35-6).
As we can see, for Kripke there are many concepts of necessity: epistemological, 
physical, logical, and metaphysical concepts. He argues that the metaphysical is not 
equivalent to a priori, but admits that the epistemological is.
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Obviously, his proposal is to address the metaphysical necessity. As we have 
seen earlier, metaphysical necessity is a modality related to the existence of things, 
not to knowledge about them. Necessary is any fact that happens in all possible 
worlds, no matter if it is known to someone.
However, following the text, Kripke talks about “something” that can be either 
true, false, or both. And metaphysical necessity is taken as “something” that cannot 
be false. But what “something” is referring to? Facts? Beliefs? Propositions? 
Obviously, facts cannot be true or false. Facts just happen (necessarily or 
contingently), even when we don’t know them. If a fact is necessary, it occurs in all 
possible worlds. So when Kripke uses the concept of truth to explain the concept 
of necessity, he cannot be talking about facts, but about beliefs, propositions, 
judgments, or something like that.
Propositions, beliefs, judgments, etc. are claims of knowledge. If the fact 
which a proposition, for example, describes does happen, the proposition is true. 
Otherwise, the proposition is false.
But what does it mean to say that a proposition is necessarily true? It means 
we have sufficient proofs to state that the proposition is true and cannot be false. 
This meaning is typically epistemological: it is an index of the justification status of 
a proposition.
But, if a proposition is necessarily true, is necessary the fact described by it, 
that is, does it occur in all possible worlds? If the answer is affirmative, we can say 
that epistemological necessity implies metaphysical necessity and that this would be 
the source of metaphysical necessity.
However, this is not necessarily the case. For example, I could imagine that 
the proposition “my dog is black” is a necessary truth, because I see my dog every 
day and I know what black means. Necessary truth, in this case, means something 
like “it is impossible that my dog is not black in the world which I am describing”. 
I am not saying anything about the other worlds. So, the epistemological necessity 
cannot be the source of the metaphysical necessity.
Furthermore, modern philosophers, like Hume, were skeptical about the 
possibility of necessary truths in the empirical cognitive domain. Empirical experience 
is always insufficient to provide a basis for necessary statements. This fact does not 
depend on individuals. The main problem is that the senses can only capture the 
present, and the necessary statements are also about the future. Therefore, it is 
always logically illegitimate to exceed experience and talk about necessary facts. 
In other words, the proof of an empirical statement is always singular perceptions, 
but singular perceptions cannot justify statements about the future (necessary 
propositions). Now, a proposition or judgment whose proof is singular perceptions 
is called a posteriori. So it is necessary to conclude that a posteriori propositions or 
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judgments are always contingent, in the sense that it is impossible to have sufficient 
proofs that they are true.
On the other hand, most modern philosophers agree that logic and mathematics 
do not have that problem, because they do not depend on experience. The proof of 
a logical or mathematical demonstration is the relationship among concepts in it or 
a pure intuition (Kant). In both cases, an empirical experience is not suitable. That 
is the reason why logic and mathematics are a priori. And because they are a priori, 
they are not conditioned by empirical experience and are necessary, in the sense 
that there are sufficient proofs that they are true without appealing to experience. 
So, when we state that some proposition is necessarily true for logical, 
mathematical or similar a priori reasons (not for empirical reasons), we are 
advocating that it is true regardless of the world. That situation allows thinking 
that the proposition is true in all possible worlds because the actual world is not the 
basis for the truth of the proposition. But this is not because the naming allows us 
to postulate a metaphysical realm. It is just an effect of the way the proposition was 
justified. In the case of propositions with empirical content, an a priori justification 
is only an analytical procedure based on the names we take as a starting point. And 
it is sometimes possible to change the meaning of these names based on changes in 
our understanding of the empirical world.
Consequently, we must admit that “necessarily true” is just an epistemological 
notion, not a metaphysical postulate. It describes the justification status of a 
proposition when we have sufficient reason to state that it cannot be false. And, how 
Kripke admits, in its epistemological meaning, necessity is the same of a priori.
Conclusion
The first conclusion of this article is that we cannot disregard the distinction 
between epistemology and metaphysics when we discuss apriority and necessity in 
Kripke. This distinction makes both neoclassical and neo-empiricist views irrelevant. 
Kripke does not claim he has discovered a method for knowing necessary truths from 
experience. He only argues that necessary truths exist, even if they are known a 
posteriori. So, if we want to reject the conclusion of Kripke’s argumentation, it is 
useless to reject the empiricism as a way of acquiring some necessary knowledge. 
We need to face the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological spheres 
because it is the basis of Kripke’s theses.
Kripke’s distinction between metaphysics and epistemology gives him the 
possibility to defend the existence of the a priori contingent and the a posteriori 
necessary judgments. However, there is a price to pay, and this is the second 
conclusion of this article: Kripke reduces epistemology to a psychological inquiry 
into how a particular person knows something. After that, it is impossible to justify 
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any proposition, including mathematics. Metaphysical necessity can be postulated, 
but it has nothing to do with necessity in the epistemological context. That is, Kripke 
cannot say that a particular proposition is necessarily or contingently true or false, 
because this kind of issue concerns epistemology, not metaphysics. Moreover, as we 
have seen, it concerns objective epistemology like the Kantian.
That leads to a third conclusion. Kripke states that there are certain necessary 
truths. For example, “Gold is an element with atomic number 79”. However, how 
can he say that? Or rather, what meaning can this statement have when we consider 
the Kripke’s presuppositions, especially the distinction between metaphysics and 
epistemology?
If Kripke’s statement had an epistemic meaning, he would be saying that 
the proposition “Gold is an element with atomic number 79” is necessarily true. 
However, if he said that, he would be falling into the trap of the dialectics. As Kant 
has advised, we cannot use logic (or a theory about the naming) as a tool for knowing 
(organon).
Therefore, we should understand Kripke’s statement about necessity (and 
contingency) exclusively in a metaphysical sense, that is, leaving aside the question 
of truth (and falsity). If the essential referent of the word “gold” is the “element 
with atomic number 79”, then in all possible worlds this will be its referent. Here 
we have just a postulate that was built on the basis of our actual world. It does not 
represent any discoveries and does not add any information.
Finally, we can conclude that the metaphysical meaning of the concept 
of necessity is only an abstraction produced from an objective epistemological 
investigation. When we discover that some proposition is necessarily true, we can 
argue that the fact described by it occurs in all possible worlds. But this is just a 
postulate based on analytical procedures or our current knowledge of the world.
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